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LEGAL INTERSEC110NS

Legal Representation of Birth Parents
and Adoptive Parents
Elizabeth Samuels

Domestic infant adoption has two primary goals: (1) preventing the
unnecessary separation of family members by ensuring that birth parents make informed and deliberate decisions and (2) protecting the finality of adoptive placements. Ideally, these goals are complementary
and can be balanced. There is, however, a danger of the second goal
eclipsing the first. Many state laws appear to value an increase in infant
adoptions over the goal of encouraging careful deliberation. Most domestic infant adoptions involve powerful market forces as well as powerful emotional pressures, and they occur in the context of a national
commitment to encourage adoptions of older children and children with
special needs. Infant adoption service providers' livelihoods or profits
generally depend on successfully arranging adoptions for their primary
clients, who, for the most part, are relatively prosperous, well-established, and socially favored married couples whose desires to bear children have been thwarted by infertility. In their efforts to adopt, these
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couples often face great difficulties and pay high fees. By contrast, birth
parents in the stressful situations that lead them to consider placing their
infants for adoption are not an organized group and are relatively powerless and socially disfavored. This article examines the role that legal
representation of these pm1ies mayor may not play in independent adoptions in promoting the deliberate decision making and finality that characterize ethically and humanely conducted adoptions.

LEGAL REPRESENTATION ISSUES
When birth parents consent to adoption, they are giving up their fundamental right to parent and are participating in a legal process in which
a court determines whether it is in the best interest ofthe child to legally
dissolve the child's birth family ties and to establish a new set of family
relationships. Given the importance of this process for all the individuals affected by it, it is crucial that both birth and adoptive parents understand the legal process, includi ng the nature of their rights and the various options available to them. Representation by an attorney, of course,
can provide the participants in the process with expert legal guidance. In
independent adoptions, the most common type of domestic infant adoption, a number of questions arise about legal representation. Is it permissible for one attorney to represent both the adoptive and birth parents?
Should the parties be required to have separate representation? Should
the parties be required to have separate representation only in cases in
which birth parents are minors or under some other disability? Although
this article focuses on independent adoptions, concerns about legal representation for birth parents also arises in agency-arranged adoptions
because ofthe likelihood of conflicts of interest between an agency's responsibility to biIth parents and the agency's commitment to prospective parents who are paying the agency's fees.
In an informal opinion in 1987, the American Bar Association (ABA)
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded that an attorney may not ethically represent both birth and adoptive parents.l This opinion, which would apply to both agency and
independent adoptions, is not binding on all states, however, and the
laws on dual representation vary throughout the country. Dual representation is expressly pennitted in at least two states, Kansas,2 and California. In California, an attorney must have written consent of the parties
before engaging in dual representation, and the attorney may not engage
in dual representation "whenever a birth parent displays the slightest
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reason for the attorney to believe any controversy might arise."3 If a
conflict arises after an attorney begins dual representation, the attorney
must withdraw under the California statute. In addition, birth parents
have the right to an independent attorney to whom prospective adoptive
parents may be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees up to $500
unless a higher fee is agreed to by the parties. On the other hand, dual
representation is expressly prohibited by statutes in a number of states,
including Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, and Wisconsin. Florida allows lawyers to serve as intermediaries
in independent adoptions, but prohibits intermediaries from providing
legal representation or advice to birth parents.4
In some states, separate representation is required only in some circumstances. Louisiana requires separate representation in all private
adoptions, while a small number of states, including Kansas, Maryland,
Montana, and Vermont, require separate representation for minor parents. s Alabama and Arkansas require appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor birth parent. 6 Maine requires the court to appoint an
attorney for an indigent birth parent who is a minor, unless the birth parent refuses or "the court determines that representation is unnecessary."7 New Hampshire requires representation if a birth parent who has
not yet relinquished parental rights is incompetent, mentally ill, or is a
person with mental retardation. 8 In practice, when separate representation is not required by law, birth parents generally are unrepresented.
There are potential risks for birth parents without representation, but as
the debates about representation reveal, there also are risks when they
are represented either by prospective adoptive parents' attorneys or by
separate counsel paid for by adoptive parents.9
Dual representation proponents argue that a conflict of interest between the parties is "often more hypothetical than real" because "both
parties are usually strongly in favor of the adoption."10 Writing about
how dual representation is permitted under some circumstances in California, lawyer Jed Somit also contends that separate representation increases costs and introduces the specter of runaway fees if the adoptive
parents are liable for the birth parents' attorneys' fees without limit. II
Separate representation "makes or at least stigmatizes as adversarial
what is ideally a cooperative process." He offers the disheartening additional argument that, despite its dangers, dual representation may be
preferable to separate representation because birth parents' attorneys
are usually paid less and may provide inferior representation. In any
event, it is claimed that "experienced adoption attorneys avoid dual representation" in the "[m]any situations" in which it is not suitable. If dual
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representation has been undertaken and a conflict arises, the attorney
should withdraw and the parties can then obtain separate counsel, or, as
expressly permitted in some state court decisions, the attorney may terminate the dual representation and choose which paliy to continue representing. 12
Opponents of dual representation, including the ABA, maintain there
are "inherent conflicts" that "cannot be reconciled" between the birth
parents' right to withhold or revoke consent and the prospective adoptive parents' goal of securing consent, and avoiding revocation. In this
view, dual representation violates Rule 1.7(a) of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which prohibits representing a client "if the
representation of [that] client will be directly adverse to another client,"
unless the attorney reasonably believes it will not be and each client
consents after consultation. 13 (While the Model Rules are not binding
on any jurisdiction, most jurisdictions have adopted some version of
them.) A secondary issue regarding dual representation may arise, of
eourse, if the birth mother's and the birth father's interests conflict, when,
for example, the birth father decides to contest the adoption. If an attorney believes, however, that the birth parents' interests are not in conflict, and both the birth parents consent, the attorney may represent them
both. When only the birth mother is represen ted by an attorney, onl y she
will enjoy the benefit of independent legal advice.
Conflicts between birth and adoptive parents may arise over not only
the ultimate issue of consent, but also issues involving financial support
during pregnancy and birth, the timing of eonsents and of placement of
the child with the prospective adoptive parents, and, if post-adoption
contact with birth parents is contemplated by the parties, the nature and
extent of future contact. The ability of parties to knowingly consent to
dual representation is doubted, given the emotional and stressful nature
of their situations: "It is difficult to believe [that they] can really grasp
the essential point: that the same lawyer is advising the birth mother and
the couple, who desperately want to obtain her child."14 Also, consent
cannot be obtained from two interested pmties: that is, the infant child
being adopted and the state. Finally, the Model Rules indicate that in
any event, the eosts for services performed by two lawyers should not
exceed the cost
the same services provided by one lawyer. "If the
savings by retaining a single attorney is obtained at the sacrifice of adequate, thorough representation of each party's separate interest, it would
seem a dubious benefit."l5
Does any expression of doubt or ambivalence by a birth parent mean
that the attorney must cease dual representation? Will a birth parent's
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interests be compromised if a conflict arises and dual representation
ceases at a time when a birth parent's right to revoke consent is about to
expire? If there has been dual representation, will adoptive parents be
vulnerable to a challenge to the adoption based on a claim of undue influence or duress? If a conflict arises, is it permissible for the attorney to
continue to represent the adoptive parents who are paying for the legal
services, even though the dual representation has "removed the communications of the parties to one another and to the attorney from the privileged category?,,16 If it is not permissible for the attorney to continue to
represent one of the parties, will costs considerably increase in situations
in which dual representation has been undertaken and later terminated?
Those who favor requiring separate representation, whether in all
cases or in a limited class of cases, emphasize the important nature of
the adoption proceeding, the typical imbalance of power between birth
parents and adoptive parents, the possibility of conflicts of interest, and
the fact that many birth mothers change their minds after the birth. Lawyers Katherine G. Thompson and Douglas H. Re1niger, for example, argue for separate representation because most mothers are young, lack
financial resources, and are in such stressful, painful S1 tuations that their
"capacity for rational decision-making at this time is not completely reliable."17 Prospective adoptive parents, in contrast, tend to be "somewhat older than most birth parents," are "usually well above average in
income and education," and are thus more financially able to retain an
attorney.18
Even with separate representation, there is a danger of birth parents'
attorneys being too closely associated with the prospective adoptive
parents or their attorneys if the birth parents' attorneys have been recommended by the adoptive parents' attorneys or are paid by the adoptive parents. The danger is described in a proposed model disclosure
form:
There is a risk that since the money is coming from [Adopting Parents] through [Adopting Parents' Attorney's] office, "I will be
more attentive to their needs, and more cooperative with that law
office, than I am to your interests .... However, I am an experienced
attorney, and I believe I can represent the interests of my clients
notwithstanding getting paid (or not getting paid) by another."19
A similar concern was articulated by an Ohio appellate court: "We
are compelled to emphasize that while there is no evidence of any impropriety as to the fee arrangement here, such may not always be the re-
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suIt. The better practice is that the birth mother be solely responsible for
her fees, or if the adoptive parents agree to the payment of the birth
mother's attorney fees, such payments must not be contingent upon the
outcome of placement or adoption."2o In a case involving an analogous
issue, a justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court noted .in a concurrence: "[T]he adoption agency is in the business, if you will, of obtaining babies for adoption .... While an agency's advising or attempting to
persuade a parent to consent to termination of parental rights does not
constitute duress ... a mother contemplating termination of her parental
rights needs distance from the agency .... The means available to insure
that distance is an attorney ... not hired or paid by the adoption
agency."21 Reflecting a similar concern is the advice that birth parents
obtain attorneys through referrals independent of adoptive parents' attorneys. H[T]he attorney for the adoptive parents should have little or no
control over what lawyer represents the birth parent(s) .... If the adoptive parents' attorney does participate in the selection process, he should
give the birth parent at least three names of experieneed attorneys ... "22
RECOMMENDATIONS

To help ensure that thc goals of adoption are successfully met, states'
adoptions laws should make clear that attorneys may not simultaneously
represent adoptive parents and birth parents. Attorneys and other adoption services providers should be required to clearly inform birth parents, orally and in acknowledged writings, that birth parents' interests
are not and may not be represented by attorneys who represent prospective adoptive parents. As provided by many states and as recommended
by the Uniform Adoption Act,n birth parents should be clearly informed that they have a right to have legal representation and that their
representation may be paid for by the prospective adoptive parents.
It is not likely that many states will decide to require separate representation for birth parents, despite its benefits in both independent and
agency-alTanged adoptions, because of the costs that are involved either
for the adoptive parents or the state. There is perhaps a better ehance
that states will follow the lead of a small number of states, and the reeommendation of the Uniform Adoption Aet,24 and will provide that parents who are minors may not give valid consent to the adoption of their
children unless they have been advised by a lawyer who is not representing adoptive parents or an adoption agency. In any event, even
though legal representation makes it more likely birth parents will un-
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derstand their legal rights, there remains a risk of a contlict of interest,
as discussed earlier, when the birth parents' attorney is paid by prospective adoptive parents. If more birth parents decide to place their children
for adoption, more work will be available for all attorneys involved in
adoptions.
Regardless of possible conflicts of interest, it is difficult to legislate
the timing and quality of representation that birth parents receive. The
Kansas Court of Appeals found that its state law requiring representation for young birth parents had been complied with in a case in which
the prospective adoptive parents' attorney "less than an hour before the
scheduled meeting [for signing consents] ... realized that under Kansas
law, [the birth parents] were to be provided independent legal COUllsel."25 An attorney whose office was in the same suite was enlisted and
briefed for five minutes. He then advised the birth parents and took their
consents, satisfying the requirement that "a minor parent shall have the
advice of independent legal counsel as to the consequences of the COI1sent or relinquishment prior to its execution," and the attorney "shall be
present at the execution" of consent.26 As a concurring North Dakota
Supreme Court justice wrote, "[m]eeting with the client immediately
before a termination of parental rights hearing for the first and only time
does not allay the perception of lack of independent counsel. It fortifies
my concern that providing counsel under such circumstances is but a
perfunctory observance of a meaningless rituaL"27 Separate legal representation for birth parents cannot alone guarantee adoption practices
that prevent unnecessary family separation and provide finality. Nor is
separate representation likely to become the rule in domestic infant
adoptions. But states and adoption service providers can and should
take at least the simple steps recommended here to ensure that legal
services will playas helpful a role as possible in promoting ethical and
humane adoption practices.
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